PRAKTIČNI POJMOVI PRAVA KAO ARTEFAKTNE VRSTE by Luka Burazin
65
Luka Burazin, PRACTICAL CONCEPTS OF LAW AS AN ARTIFACT KIND
Luka Burazin, PhD, 
Assistant Professor*
PRACTICAL CONCEPTS OF LAW AS AN 
ARTIFACT KIND
Summary:  It is often said that, in contrast to natural kinds, artifacts are mind-dependent, 
meaning that they somehow depend on either human beliefs or activities. In 
addition, some speci"cally claim that this mind-dependency of artifacts means 
that they are concept-dependent, i.e., that they are constituted by the concepts 
and intentions of humans (artifact authors or creators) and that the latter, in 
turn, determine what features are relevant for an artifact to be a member of a 
certain artifact kind. #e paper therefore inquires into what these constitutive 
concepts are and what role they play. It also tries to explain the relationship 
between these concepts and the ‘theoretical’ ones. Since the paper’s main thesis is 
that law as such is an artifact or, more precisely, that legal systems are artifacts, it 
considers the said issue speci"cally in relation to the jurisprudential views on the 
ontological character of law.
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1. INTRODUCTION
According to the classical theory of concepts, concepts have a de!nitional structure. #e 
concept of a given entity is a de!nition of that entity, expressing its necessary and su$cient 
conditions which serve as criteria for determining whether something is or is not that kind of 
entity and whether it falls under that concept.1 By providing for the necessary and su$cient 
conditions, which in fact amount to the entity’s neccesary or essential features or properties, 
the concept is usually taken to describe the nature of the entity which it is the concept of. 
Since concepts are the building blocks of scienti!c theories, it seems that the same idea about 
concepts describing the nature of the theorised entity applies to any ontologically existing 
1  See Margolis, E., Laurence, S., Concepts, #e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Zalta, E. N. (ed.), http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/concepts/. Accessed 15 August 2015.
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kind. #e concept of either natural or artifact kind entity should be such as to express the nec-
essary or essential properties of the entity whose concept it is. We !nd a concept adequate if 
it accurately describes the essence of the entity in question. I will therefore call such concepts 
‘theoretical’ concepts. Of course, whether, in the case of artifacts, such ‘theoretical’ concepts 
describe the artifacts’ necessary or essential properties or only the contingent but important 
ones and whether the “classical” theory of concepts rather than some other (e.g. a prototype 
theory) is more adequate depends on our view of the ontological character of artifacts. #is is 
an issue I will not pursue here in detail.
Instead, I will attempt at a di+erent line of inquiry. It is often said that, in contrast to 
natural kinds, artifacts are mind-dependent, meaning that they somehow depend on either 
human beliefs or activities. In addition, some speci!cally claim that this mind-dependency of 
artifacts means that they are concept-dependent, i.e., that they are constituted by the concepts 
and intentions of humans (artifact authors or creators) and that the latter, in turn, determine 
what features are relevant for an artifact to be a member of a certain artifact kind.2 I will 
therefore inquire into what these constitutive concepts are and what role they play. I will also 
try to explain the relationship between these concepts and the above described ‘theoretical’ 
ones. Since the paper’s main thesis is that law as such is an artifact or, more precisely, that 
legal systems are artifacts, in what follows I will consider the said issue speci!cally in relation 
to the jurisprudential views on the ontological character of law. 
2. LAW AS A CONCEPTINDEPENDENT ARTIFACT?
If one were to take law to be a natural kind, as law perhaps is seen from some natural law 
perspective,3 then presumably it would have a (descriptive) ‘theoretical’ concept, but not the 
one identi!ed above as a “constitutive” concept. #is would be so since natural kinds are not 
concept-dependent in their existence, but it is still valuable for us to have some ‘theoretical’ 
concept of them. #e concept of law would be a description of law’s necessary natural proper-
ties, i.e., the properties law cannot fail to have by its nature. 
Some, however, claim that even if law were seen as an artifact kind, it would be possible for 
law to have a concept-independent nature,4 which would seemingly result in our attempts to 
elucidate a descriptive ‘theoretical’ concept of law. According to Schauer, “some of the socially 
constructed part of the world is both social and 7uid, and so our understanding of abstrac-
2  See #omasson, A. L., Artifacts and Human Concepts, in Margolis E., Laurence, S. (eds.), Creations of the Minds, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2007, pp. 52–73.
3  “Some people believe that norms of morality or law do not have to be posited by any act in order to be valid. For, they believe, 
there are norms which are immediately valid or claim to be immediately valid since they are given in reality or ‘nature’, that is, 
they are immanent in nature. Hence their validity is no more ‘arbitrary’ than that of the causal laws of nature. #eir validity is not 
conditional upon the will of the subjects whose behaviour they regulate, nor upon the will of any norm-positing subject. #eir 
validity is – in this sense – as objective as that of the law that metals expand when heated. #e nature in which these norms are 
immanent is either Nature in general, i.e. the totality of reality, or a particular nature, i.e. that of man. Such is the assumption 
of so-called Natural Law theory, which is opposed to ethical and legal positivism.” Kelsen, H., General #eory of Norms, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1991, pp. 4–5.
4  Schauer, F., Is #ere a Concept  of Law?, in Gizbert-Studnicki T., Stelmach J. (eds.), Law and Legal Cultures in the 21st Century – 
Diversity and Unity, 23rd IVR World Congress – Plenary Lectures, Wolter Kluwer Polska, Warsaw, 2007, p. 21.
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tions like ‘culture’ and institutions like ‘government’ are dependent on ever-shifting collective 
human notions of what culture and government just are. But other parts of the constructed 
world are artifacts like clocks and hammers and chairs, and although these and all other ar-
tifacts too are the products of human e+orts, they appear to be di+erent from culture and 
government. And this di+erence derives from the way in which such artifacts are consider-
ably less dependent upon a social or collective process for their creation – the person who 
made the !rst hammer may well have done so all alone – and, in part, because once created 
the actual artifacts are rarely 7uid”.5 #erefore, if one would take law to be a type of artifact 
which resembles ‘ordinary’ artifacts like clocks, hammers and chairs, law would have a sort of 
concept-independent nature (even if perhaps its initial creation depended on the existence of 
some concept of it) and there would only be room for a descriptive and ‘theoretical’ concept 
of law, as is the case with concepts of natural kinds. Viewing law as this type of artifact would 
also, as Schauer suggests, encourage us “to focus our attention on the empirical existence of 
law, and on the question of the relationship of the thing we happen to call ‘law’ and the con-
cept of law we are trying to locate”.6 
On the basis of this ‘!nding’ that law might be seen as a type of concept-independent ar-
tifact, Schauer goes on to make the following distinction – one between those who see law’s 
empiricial existence and may therefore be regarded as those who view law as an artifact and 
those who claim that the concept of law is “a necessary precondition for the very existence 
of the category of law” and who may therefore be regarded as those who reject that law is an 
artifact.7 On this view, it seems that, if law is an artifact (of the type Schauer identi!es as con-
cept-independent), the concept of law plays no more than a descriptive, ‘theoretical’ role, and 
if law is not an artifact (or, of course, a natural kind), then ther exists an additional, “non-the-
oretical” (or “practical”), concept of law which plays a constitutive role. As B. Bix puts it, “if the 
boundaries of ‘law’ are not set by ‘the way the world is’ (…), then what does establish those 
boundaries? #e obvious answer appears to be the concept itself. (Of course, by speaking of 
the concept, we mean indirectly the population(s) as a whole who developed the concept in 
question.) It is the concepts that set the boundaries”.8
3. LEGAL SYSTEMS AS ABSTRACT INSTITUTIONAL ARTIFACTS
I think, however, that Schauer’s view of the relationship between ‘law’s’ nature (i.e., wheth-
er ‘law’ is an artifact kind or not) and the consequences this has for the role of the concept of 
law is based on the misleading assumption that law is an artifact similar to ‘ordinary’ artifacts 
in that it is concept-independent. Here I will leave aside the fact that on the in7uential view 
on artifacts in general philosophy, one advocated by Risto Hilpinen and Amie #omasson, 
5  Ibid., p. 20.
6  Ibid., p. 21.
7  Ibid., pp. 21–22.
8  Bix, B., Joseph Raz and Conceptual Analysis, APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law, Spring 2007, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 2.
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‘ordinary’ artifacts are also concept-dependent entities.9 As I have argued elsewhere,10 while it 
is true that the theories of artifacts developed in general philosophy over the last thirty years 
seem applicable to ‘ordinary’ artifacts (such as chairs, clocks or hammers), they do not seem to 
give an appropriate account of all the objects intentionally created for a certain purpose, i.e., 
of those artifacts that do not fall into the category of ‘ordinary’ artifacts. Speci!cally, there are 
entities, institutional objects (e.g., money, boundaries, private property, legislatures, govern-
ments, laws, corporations or nation-states), for some of which it may indeed be claimed that 
they are objects intentionally created for a certain purpose under a certain description, and 
thus artifacts, according to their standard de!nition. I call such entities institutional artifacts. 
However, as opposed to ‘ordinary’ artifacts, to which, as has been claimed, only the individual 
intentions of their authors are relevant,11 institutional artifacts require for their existence 
(both their creation and their continued existence) collective intentionality.12 Additionaly, 
they require constitutive rules on the basis of which humans either impose status functions 
on existing persons or material objects (concrete institutional objects), or bring into existence 
new entities by making it the case that certain entities with certain status functions exist 
(abstract institutional objects).13
According to the artifact theory of law I sketched in my paper Can #ere Be an Artifact 
#eory of Law?, legal systems, for instance, are precisely this type of artifact, i.e., (abstract) 
institutional artifacts.14 #us, in order to see why Schauer’s claim that on the artifact concep-
tion of law’s nature there is only room for a theoretical concept of law, playing a descriptive 
role, does not fully capture the entire story about law as an artifact and the roles concepts play 
with regard to the artifact kind ‘legal system’, it is !rst necessary to explain what it means to 
say that legal systems are abstract institutional artifacts. Legal systems are artifacts because 
they are created by authors (as a rule collective ones) having a particular intention to create 
the institutional artifact ‘legal system’, based on the authors’ substantive and substantively 
correct concept of what the legal system is, under the condition that this intention be largely 
successfully realised. #e intention required here is, of course, not an individual intention or a 
sum of individual intentions but the result of collective intentionality. By being institutional 
by nature, institutional artifacts di+er from ‘ordinary’ artifacts (such as chairs, hammers or 
clocks) in that they are rule-based and require collective recognition (acceptance). #is means 
that they can initially be created only if there is collective recognition of the relevant constitu-
tive rules and can continue to exist only for as long as this recognition is maintained. Finally, 
9  See e.g. Hilpinen, R., Artifact, #e Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition). Zalta, E. N. (ed.), http://plato.
standford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/artifact/, accessed 15 August 2015 and #omasson, op. cit. note 2.
10  See Burazin, L., Can #ere Be an Artifact #eory of Law?, Ratio Juris – An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy 
of Law, forthcoming 2016, pp. 15–16. Avalilable at: https://www.academia.edu/9987523/Can#ereBeanArtifact#eoryofLaw.
11  Pace Searle, who claims that even such artifacts as hammers or screwdrivers are created by imposing on them a certain function 
by collective intentionality. See Searle, J. R., #e Construction of Social Reality, #e Free Press, New York, 1995, p. 126. See also 
#omasson, A. L., Public Artifacts, Intentions, and Norms, in Franssen, M.; Kroes, P.; Reydon, T. A. C.; Vermaas, P. E. (eds.), 
Artefact Kinds, Springer, 2014, pp. 54–55, who now thinks “that there is an important and revealing sense in which members of 
public artifact kinds do depend on intentional states beyond those of their makers”.
12  For a short overview of the di+erent views about when some mental state may be regarded as collective, see #omasson, A. L., 
Social Entities, in Le Poidevin, R. et al. (eds.), Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge, London, 2009, p. 547. 
13  Searle, op. cit. note 11, pp. 41–51, Searle, J. R., Making the Social World: #e Structure of Human Civilization, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2010, pp. 22 and 97–102, and #omasson, A. L., Realism and Human Kinds, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 67(3), 2003, pp. 587–588.
14  See Burazin, op. cit. note 10, pp. 23–28.
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they are abstract in the sense that they are not created by imposing the status function ‘legal 
system’ to any existing physical object or person but by making it the case that they exist pro-
vided certain conditions are ful!lled. Making it the case that a legal system exists is realised 
through the collective recognition of the existential constitutive rule laying out a set of condi-
tions for there to be a legal system.
#e rule through the collective recognition of which the relevant community makes it the 
case that there is a legal system creates the context in which an instance of the legal system 
can emerge. #is rule may be formulated as follows:
We (collectively) recognise that, if conditions C obtain, then there is a legal system. 
#e set of conditions C laid out in a legal system’s constitutive rule represents su$cient 
existence-conditions for there to be a legal system. Since a legal system is an artifact kind, this 
set of existence-conditions seems to include at least the set of conditions for being an artifact. 
It thus includes the conditions of both authorship and intention. #e authorship condition 
requires that there be an author (as a rule a collective one), collectivelly recognised as such by 
the relevant community, who creates a legal system. #e intention condition requires that this 
author have a particular intention (resulting from the collective intentionality of people con-
stituting the collective author) to create the institutional artifact kind ‘legal system’, that this 
intention be based on the author’s substantive concept of the legal system, and that eventually 
this intention be at least largely successfully realised. Since these conditions de!ne the artifac-
tual character of the legal system, one can say that they, in fact, amount to the initial concept 
of the legal system. Moreover, the set of conditions laid out in a legal system’s constitutive rule 
usually also includes further conditions. #ese additional conditions may vary from the simple 
requirement that whatever a group of people whom the community (collectively) recognises as 
the authors of the legal system counts as a legal system is a legal system to more detailed and 
informed existence conditions of a legal system (e.g., that the totality of rules authors count as 
belonging to a legal system is a legal system or that a legal system is whatever authors count as 
a legal system as long as they themselves are also legally limited by it or provided that the legal 
system upholds human rights, expresses the rule of law principle, etc.). #e concept of law is, 
after all, the concept of an artifact and since artifacts are susceptible to change (depending on 
human interests), their concepts can also change. #is further means that through collective 
recognition of a legal system’s constitutive rule the relevant community’s concept of the legal 
system plays a stipulative role in establishing the ‘nature’ of the legal system.
#is, however, is a !rst-level stipulation only. #e relevent community thus sets out the 
initial general idea of its legal system but does not as yet create an instantiation of it. For an 
instantiation of a legal system to emerge, someone has to concretise or implement the general 
idea (i.e., someone has to bring about that conditions C from the legal system’s constitutive 
rule obtain). Since, if we take Hart’s theory of legal systems as explanatorily adequate, a le-
gal system acquires its main feature (i.e., that of being a system of rules) through the rule of 
recognition, which rule is constituted by the practices of legal o$cials, one may say that legal 
o$cials are the true (collective) author of a particular instantiation or token of the legal sys-
tem. And if legal o$cials are indeed the authors of a legal system, collectively recognised by 
the relevant community as having the status function ‘legal o$cials’ (a function which implies 
the corresponding deontic powers of identifying, creating, modifying and applying law), it 
should not be false to assume that their practices are collectively intended by them as practices 
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exercised in view of ful!lling their o$cial role. #e manifestation of their collective intention 
to act in such a way is most discernable in their regarding their patterns of behaviour as a rule 
– a rule (of recognition) which, according to Hart, forms the foundations of a legal system.15 
It may thus be said that their collective intention is the intention to create a legal system. Ac-
cording to the artifact theory of law, legal o$cials’ intention to create an instantiation of the 
legal system is based on their substantive concept of the legal system. If one remains within 
the framework of Hart’s theory, it is reasonable to assume that the concept of the legal system 
o$cials have includes at least the following two features: that the legal system is a system of 
valid legal rules, i.e., rules that are members of one and the same system of rules, and that the 
legal system is structured as a union of primary and secondary legal rules. So what the rele-
vant community’s constitutive rule of a legal system does is create the context in which the 
practice of legal o$cials as authors of a legal system, resulting in the rule of recognition and 
other secondary rules, can be understood as concretising or implementing the community’s 
general concept of a legal system and stipulating the ‘nature’ of the legal system at the second 
level. For, as Finnis says, “the (making of the) artefact is controlled but not fully determined 
by the basic idea (say, the client’s order), and until it is fully determinate the artefact is non-ex-
istent or incomplete”.16
Of course, apart from being relevant to the making of a legal system, the relevant commu-
nity’s (collective) concept is relevant to its continued existence. A legal system exists only in so 
far as the relevant community collectively recognises it as being a legal system or only in so far 
as the author’s intentions at least largely match the relevant community’s (collective) concept 
of the legal system. #is is in tune with Hart’s claim that where there is a general disregard of 
the rules of a system, one should say that “in the case of a new system, that it had never estab-
lished itself as the legal system of a given group, or, in the case of a once-established system, 
that it had ceased to be the legal system of the group”.17 It follows therefrom that some person 
or group of persons could create a new system of rules which would have its rule of recognition 
but which would not amount to a particular community’s legal system since there would be 
a general disregard of its rules. According to the artifact theory of law, the authors and their 
intentions would no doubt exist but since collective recognition by the relevant community 
lacks, there would be no institutional artifact.
4. PRACTICAL CONCEPTS OF LAW
So coming back to our initial question concerning the way the roles of concepts bear on 
the ontological character of law, it is !rst important to note that what is at issue here is not 
just one concept of law, but at least two (in primitive legal systems) or three concepts of law 
(in more developed legal systems). Secondly, it is important to distinguish between ‘non-theo-
retical’ or ‘practical’ concepts of law (which are constitutive of a legal system) and ‘theoretical’ 
concepts of law (which amount to a theoretical account of the practical concepts). Two such 
15  Hart, H. L. A., #e Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, p. 100.
16  Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 284.
17  Hart, op. cit. note 15, p. 103.
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‘non-theoretical’ or ‘practical’ concepts have just been described in the very brief outline of the 
artifactual character of legal systems. One of the two ‘practical’ concepts of law is that held by 
the relevant community. It is the concept embedded in the community’s social practices con-
sisting primarily of following rules as rules of the community. Since it lives in the practice of 
the relevant community and is the conceptual understanding of a given legal system’s partici-
pants, linking their doings and sayings regarding the following of the rules of their communi-
ty, one can say that it amounts to the relevant community’s nonpropositional conceptual un-
derstanding of the legal system.18 #is concept serves as the basis for the community’s collec-
tive recognition of the constitutive rule which lays out the existence conditions for there to be 
a legal system. #e relevant community’s concept thus includes a conceptual understanding of 
a legal system’s existence conditions. #is understanding necessarily has as its object at least a 
conceptual understanding of what it is for something to be an artifact. It thus includes at least 
an understanding of the authorship of a legal system and an understanding of the author’s 
intention to create a legal system. However, it often includes an understanding of, for exam-
ple, some additional existence conditions for a legal system. #is may be an understanding of 
the simple requirement that whatever a group of people whom the community (collectively) 
recognises as the authors of a particular legal system counts as a legal system is a legal system 
to more detailed and informed existence conditions of a legal system. Since these conditions 
vary over time and places, depending on shifting human interests and purposes, the relevant 
community’s concept of law, which includes an understanding of the legal system’s existence 
conditions, also changes. Furthermore, since the relevant community collectively recognises 
the constitutive rule of its legal system on the basis of the concept of law it has developed, it 
is safe to acknowledge that the community’s concept plays a stipulative and thus constitutive 
role in establishing the ‘nature’ of the legal system.
As was noted above, however, this is a !rst-level stipulation only. #e relevant communi-
ty’s social practices create the context in which instances of the legal system can emerge. Social 
practices, according to Toumela, “are conceptually the basis of thinking and acting on the basis 
of all thinking and all other conceptual activities, viz., thinking and acting on the basis of con-
cepts”.19 In the case of legal systems, the relevant social practices are conceptually the basis of 
creating instances of legal systems on the basis of the relevant community’s concept of law. 
#e relevant community thus sets out the initial general idea of its legal system but does not 
create an instantiation of it. In fact, whether the relevant community also creates an instanti-
ation of it or not depends on whose practices establish the rule of recognition. For a primitive 
legal system to emerge it is su$cient that the relevant community acknowledge the reference 
to some list or text of rules as authoritative with regard to the question of whether some rule 
is a rule of their community.20 Where this is the case, there exists only one ‘non-theoretical’ 
or ‘practical’ concept of law, i.e., that of the relevant community, which includes not only an 
understanding of the basic existence conditions for there to be a legal system, but also an un-
derstanding and recognition of their legal system’s rule of recognition. However, in the case 
of a developed legal system with a more complex rule of recognition (which identi!es rules as 
18  For the distinction between nonpropositional and propositional understanding see Schatzki, T. R., Social Practices – A 
Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 92–93.
19  Toumela, R., #e Philosophy of Social Practices – A Collective Acceptance View, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 43.
20  See Hart, op. cit. note 15, pp. 94–95.
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the rules of the system by reference to some general characteristic possessed by the primary 
rules),21 it is the practice of o$cials that establishes the rule of recognition. Since the rule of 
recognition marks the transition from a pre-legal state of a+airs to a state of a+airs where a 
legal system exists, it may be said that for an instantiation of such a developed legal system to 
emerge, there have to be, besides the relevant community, o$cials to concretise or implement 
the general idea of a legal system shared by the relevant community. Where this is the case, 
there then exist two ‘non-theoretical’ or ‘practical’ concepts of law, i.e., that of the relevant 
community and that of o$cials. #e concept of law shared by legal o$cials is embedded in the 
relevant o$cials’ social practices. Since it lives in the practice of the relevant o$cials and is the 
conceptual understanding of a given legal system’s participants (i.e., those participants having 
an o$cial role), one can say that it amounts to the o$cials’ nonpropositional conceptual un-
derstanding of a legal system. #is concept serves as the basis for the o$cials regarding their 
pattern of behaviour as a rule setting the validity criteria for the rules of their system. Besides 
an understanding of the relevant community’s concept of law, the o$cials’ concept of law 
thus includes a conceptual understanding of at least two features of a legal system: that the 
legal system is a system of valid legal rules, i.e., rules that are members of one and the same 
system of rules, and that the legal system is structured as a union of primary and secondary 
legal rules. So, as has already been noted above, the relevant community’s concept of law and 
their recognition of their legal system’s constitutive rule create the context in which the prac-
tice of legal o$cials as the authors of the legal system can be understood as concretisation or 
implementation of the community’s general concept of the legal system and stipulation of the 
‘nature’ of the legal system at the second level.
However, these ‘non-theoretical’ or ‘practical’ concepts of law, i.e., the relevant communi-
ty’s and the o$cials’, are not some universal concepts of the legal system. #ey are ‘our’ con-
cepts, or ‘folk’ concepts, or nonpropositional conceptual understandings of the legal system. 
Since the ‘practical’ concept of law is a ‘folk’ concept, and the folk can get it wrong – and if not 
wrong, then at least they cannot elaborate it in detail and in a coherent and intelligible man-
ner – knowledge of this concept can be got only by engaging in conceptual analysis (intuitive 
or empirical) of what the folk think about the legal system. Another reason for engaging in 
the analysis of the ‘folk’ concept is that the folk have only a substantive concept of the legal 
system. Since legal systems develop, concepts of legal systems develop as well. It is therefore 
impossible to get full knowledge of the concept of the legal system only by describing its folk 
concept.
Consequently, it is necessary to develop a theoretical account of the folk concept of the 
legal system, i.e., to develop a ‘theoretical’ concept of law. Since the theoretical account devel-
oped can be disengaged from practice (in such a way that practice be formulated by partici-
pants in sentences furnished to nonparticipants), such theoretical account is then our propo-
sitional understanding of the legal system.22 
21  See ibid., p. 95.
22  Compare Schatzki, op. cit. note 18, pp. 92–93.
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5. CONCLUDING METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
#e substantive ‘non-theoretical’ or ‘practical’ concept, whether that of the relevant com-
munity or that of o$cials, is an a priori concept. It does not describe something that already 
exists, but constitutes (or at least creates the possibility for) a new entity. It is therefore a 
deeply normative concept. It is normative since it is based on the intentions of those whose 
concept it is, “tying” thus to the legal system a set of features which determine the legal sys-
tem’s intended character. However, although the concept itself is normative, this does not 
mean that the methodology for discovering its content should also be normative, rather than 
analytic, descriptive or explanatory. #is, however, has consequences for the analysis of par-
ticular instances (tokens) of the concept. In order to tell whether a particular instance is a 
proper instance of a concept, we have to !rst evaluate the instance against the background of 
the relevant community’s concept of the legal system. In order to know whether a particular 
entity x is a legal system, we initially have to know what this concept should be in the !rst 
place and then determine, as Hilpinen puts it, “the degree of !t or agreement” between the in-
tended character of a legal system and its actual character.23 Since the concept of the legal sys-
tem is the concept of an artifact, and artifacts are susceptible to change (depending on human 
interests), the concept itself can change. It changes through the subsequent emergence of its 
new instances and the uses to which these new instances are put by people. Since the concept 
of the legal system is malleable, and indeed changes through time, it cannot have neccesary 
and su$cient features. Its features are contingent – they depend on how the concept develops. 
Consequently it seems that there is no room for the essentialist approach to the giving of an 
adequate account of the concept of the legal system. Rather, we as legal theorists should con-
tinually engage in the conceptual analysis of the ever changing and developing practical (‘folk’) 
concept of the legal system in order to describe its, as Schauer correctly emphasizes, impor-
tant but contingent features and thus acquire knowledge of what the legal system really is.
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PRAKTIČNI POJMOVI PRAVA KAO ARTEFAKTNE VRSTE
Sažetak
Često se kaže da su, za razliku od prirodnih vrsta, artefakti umno ovisni, podrazumijeva-
jući pod tim da artefakti na neki način ovise o ljudskim vjerovanjima ili djelovanjima. Osim 
toga, neki još određenije tvrde da ta umna ovisnost artefakata znači da su oni pojmovno ovi-
sni, tj. da su konstituirani pojmovima i intencijama ljudi (autora ili stvaratelja artefakata) te 
da ovi, pak, određuju koja su to važna obilježja nekog artefakta koja ga čine pripadnikom neke 
artefaktne vrste. U radu se stoga ispituje što su to konstitutivni pojmovi i koju ulogu imaju. 
Također, nastoji se objasniti odnos između tih pojmova i onih “teorijskih”. Budući da je osnov-
na teza rada da je pravo kao takvo, ili preciznije, pravni sustav artefakt, spomenuto se pitanje 
razmatra posebno u odnosu na pravno!lozofska gledišta o ontološkom značaju prava.
Ključne riječi:   pravni sustavi, artefaktne vrste, institucionalni artefakti, pojmovna ovisnost, 
praktični pojmovi, teorijski pojmovi
